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In After the Beautiful, Robert Pippin articulates and defends a modified version of 
Hegelian philosophy of art. The “after” in his title indicates both “in the spirit and style 
of” and “since,” so that we are offered a recognizably Hegelian story that is also 
distinctively adapted to modern life and art in surprising, non-Hegelian ways. He then 
undertakes to put this Hegelian philosophy of art to work to investigate and elucidate the 
achievements of pictorial modernism, principally those of Manet and Cezanne, “the 
grandfather and father of modernism in painting,” as Pippin puts it (p. 2).  The 
articulation, defense, investigation, and elucidation are organized around two sets of 
large, important claims that Pippin makes about Hegel. 
1) Hegel is right that art, or at least important art that is responsive to the highest 
ambitions and possibilities of artmaking, is a socially inflected, affective-sensuous 
presentation that serves as a critical vehicle of self-knowledge in relation to possibilities 
(and inhibitions) of free and meaningful life, individual and joint. This way of thinking 
about art puts Hegel importantly at odds with the two main streams of philosophy of art 
in the Anglo-American tradition of the last four hundred or so years: taste theory, with its 
obsession with whether identifications of works of art are objective, subjective, or 
something in between, and forms of modernist theory that emphasize the autonomy of 
artistic works and forms from cognitive and social content. (Hegelian and neo-Hegelian 
views have had more life within the German tradition in the philosophy of art; in the 
English-speaking world, there are echoes of Hegel in Collingwood, Dewey, and Danto.) 
As Pippin sees things, that some major works of art conspicuously matter to and for us by 
presenting important human content sensuously and affectively is pretty much obviously 
true, and it is a significant virtue of the Hegelian stance that it articulates this fact. 
2) But Hegel is wrong to hold, as he did most conspicuously in his Elements of 
the Philosophy of Right, that full or even generally satisfactory ‘binding’ to modern life is 
available to effectively all individuals and groups under the mediating structures of 
modern social institutions. That modern life is “a world of freedom realized, or 
reconciled social relations of persons who are free because they actually stand in relations 
of at least institutionally secured mutuality of recognition” is, as Pippin puts it contra 
Hegel, “clearly false as a claim about European modernity in the first third of the 
nineteenth century” and after (p. 37). 
The consequence of these two sets of claims is that we are to see “artworks as 
elements in ...a collective attempt at self-knowledge across historical time, and to see 
such self-knowledge as essential elements [sic] in the struggle for the realization of 
freedom, where freedom is understood in [an] identificatory, expressivist sense” as a 
matter of a “nonalienated relation to [one’s] deeds” (p. 25). (It would be pertinent to 
compare this understanding of freedom with the account of “expressive freedom” as “the 
achievement of further understanding coupled with strengthened and purified affections 
then discharged in a dense, medium-specific performance of working through, in which a 
point of view is made manifest and recognition and like-mindedness are successfully 
solicited” that is present in Richard Eldridge, Literature, Life, and Modernity [Columbia, 
2008], p. 109.) 
Pippin fills in the relevant identificatory, expressivist sense of freedom by noting 
that coming to have and to sustain what he calls a “practical identity” is a practical 
problem for us.  “For Hegel, what we take ourselves to be is an avowal or commitment, a 
pledge about what we shall keep faith with, and is not a simple self-observation” (p. 41).  
Nor is a practical identity something that one can simply will on one’s own, since the 
available act descriptions for what one is doing are significantly socially afforded, and 
since one must be recognized by others to be doing what one takes oneself to do, under a 
description, if that characterization is to be sustainable (p. 19). 
Given the widely ramified and often significantly divergent and mutually opaque 
social roles that are available within a modern industrial-technological economy, it will 
frequently enough be difficult to work out and sustain a practical identity that is widely 
endorsable under shared act-descriptions. Achieving and sustaining an endorsable 
practical identity is, moreover, a specially pressing problem for artists within such an 
economy, when art no longer has core religious-ritual functions and when a patronage 
system has given way to a market system for art’s production and distribution. Hegel in 
fact registers this fact in noting the increasing subjectivization of art in modernity: the 
ability of artists to choose any subject matters and media.  The price of this freedom is 
then a pervasive and standing anxiety, at least for artists of major ambition, about how to 
make such choices so as to manifest an endorsable practical identity in one’s work. As 
Hegel puts it, what is to be done in a work in order to accomplish this must be worked out 
(herausgearbeitet). (Compare the account of working through, durcharbeiten, in 
Eldridge, Literature, Life, and Modernity, pp. 18-19, 111.) As Pippin puts it in 
commenting on this crucial word, “We don’t know, in any determinate or ‘living’ detail, 
who we actually take ourselves to be except in such externalization, either in action or in 
such material production as artworks” (p. 41). Hence the struggles of artists to achieve 
practical identity in an artistic work that in its materials and organization embodies 
fullness of attention to difficult modern life—struggles that are sometimes successfully 
enough concluded—become significant models of human struggles to achieve practical 
identity as such. 
Drawing on and developing this background story, Pippin then turns to the details 
of how Manet and Cezanne exemplarily address the problem of artistic practical identity 
and of fullness of attention in specific paintings. In doing this he turns to the art historians 
Michael Fried, especially his Absorption and Theatricality and Manet’s Modernism, and 
T. J. Clark, especially his The Painting of Modern Life. Roughly and schematically, Fried 
emphasizes the pictorial achievement of absorptiveness—what Kant called our being 
moved to linger in (verweilen) the painting’s working of thematically charged forms and 
materials. Clark emphasizes the motivation of painting by (the artist’s sense of) difficult 
social circumstances and painting’s address to these circumstances. In bringing these two 
figures together, Pippin argues effectively that their modes of attention to art are more 
complementary than they are often taken to be, and this in virtue of the fact—as the neo-
Hegelian story makes manifest—that art has both a cognitive-social content and a 
compelling sensuous-affective mode of presenting it. This complementarity and its 
relation to the neo-Hegelian story are important, major results for art historians and 
philosophers of art. 
It is impossible to do justice in a short review to the detailed readings of specific 
paintings that Pippin develops by drawing on Fried and Clark. Especially striking and 
insightful to me were the readings of Manet’s Arguentueil (1874) and Boating (1874), 
where Pippin focuses on the “’weakened presence’ of animated subjectivity” in the 
expressions of the principal figures.  In Cezanne’s Large Bathers series  (1894-1905, 
1895-1906, 1906), Pippin sees objects, including people, simply coming into being, as if 
from vibrations within them, as brute presences, and in doing so as registering an absence 
of available social meaning for human subjects. To my eye, this reading underplays the 
air of oneiric, infantile sexuality in these paintings upon which, as Pippin notes (p. 
128n.4), Clark has remarked. These will be matters for readers and viewers to consider 
for themselves. Pippin’s larger argument that modern paintings at the hands of Manet and 
Cezanne present such kinds of meanings visually, affectively, and sensuously, in ways 
that Hegel redevivus helps us to understand, is unimpeachable. 
Outside the philosophy of art alone, one broader significance of this kind of work 
is its drawing of connections between topics in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of 
art, and social philosophy. If meaning can be embodied in art in those ways, in relation to 
socially situated possibilities of practical identity, then there are more varieties of 
meaning, thought, and value for the philosophy of mind, ethics, and social philosophy to 
consider than they sometimes do. This, too, is an important result. 
In describing the affective-sensuous presence of some successful major paintings, 
Pippin sometimes displays a certain awkwardness about the aesthetic. “After” in “after 
the beautiful” sometimes indicates art that does not strive for beauty, with the airs of 
decorativeness and entertainment that “the beautiful” may suggest (p. 133). Yet Pippin 
also describes the artistic achievement of these paintings as the achievement of “aesthetic 
intelligibility” understood as “a distinct-sensible affective modality of intelligibility” (p. 
135). Sorting out the difference between the merely sensuously pleasant (the agreeable in 
Kantian terms) and the beautiful with its distinct aesthetic intelligibility would take more 
theoretical labor than Pippin undertakes here directly. Arguably, however, Pippin’s 
indirectness about this issue might be the path of wisdom, since anyone who is unable to 
see that something like aesthetic intelligibility is what is on offer in Manet and Cezanne 
is unlikely to be brought to this thought by a general theory of the aesthetic. 
Finally, one might wonder whether “freedom in an identificatory-expressivist 
sense” really matters very much to very many people other than a few major obsessive 
artists and those who fall under their sways. Is it really possible to achieve this kind of 
freedom, this kind of expressive practical identity in fullness of artistic attention to 
difficult life? Is it really something of central value to very many? There are no simple, 
straightforward answers to these questions. One might suppose that while the answers are 
“no, not absolutely” (so that artistic achievements have less than perfect absoluteness and 
stability), and “for many people, not so much of the time” (so that the production and 
experience of major art are less pressing matters than, say, earning a living wage, politics, 
or the pursuit of theoretical knowledge). But then one might also suppose that some kind 
of art matters intensely to almost all people at some moments in their lives, perhaps 
crucial ones, and that developing and sustaining a practical identity, in Pippin’s sense, 
however imperfect such a thing may turn out to be, is an ambition in the absence of 
which human life in culture would be unrecognizable. 
